Richard Dawkins, "The Making of a Scientist" | Talks at Google

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[MUSIC PLAYING]

RICHARD DAWKINS: Thank you very much.

Some of my titles may be good.

I'm quite pleased with "The Blind Watchmaker,"

as Ray Kurtzweil has said.

"The Selfish Gene" is not a bad title.

But it's unfortunately been rather

widely read by title only.

Various critics have omitted to read the rather substantial

footnote, which is the book itself.

This new book, "An Appetite for Wonder,"

the subtitle is "The Making of a Scientist,"

it is a memoir of the first half of my life,

up to the age of 35, and it culminates

in the writing of "The Selfish Gene."

So there's going to be a volume two, in two year's time.

It was all supposed to have been one volume.

But I kind of lost a bit of stamina halfway

through and decided I needed a bit of positive reinforcement.

So I asked the publisher if I could split it in half

and produce it in two volumes.

And so it is actually a rather natural breakpoint.

"The Selfish Gene" was a fairly natural breakpoint in my life.

So I'm going to go through with a set of readings, kind

of strung together with a bit of talk.

The book begins with ancestors, and goes on

to my childhood, and school days.

And I got one or two little anecdotes

from school days, which might be vaguely amusing.

I was sent to boarding schools of a rather British kind

and rather young actually.

I was first sent to boarding school

at the age of seven, which is a bit too

young to be sent away to school.

I used to have fantasies that the matron would

turn into my mother.

And I thought that since both of them had dark, curly hair,

it wouldn't take too much of a miracle to achieve that.

So I'm going to read a little bit about school days.

I was an exceptionally untidy and disorganized little boy

in my early years.

My first school reports dwelt insistently

on the theme of ink.

Headmaster's report-- He has produced some good work

and well deserves his prize.

A very inky little boy at present,

which is apt to spoil his work.

Latin-- He has made steady progress.

But unfortunately when using ink,

his written work becomes very untidy.

Mathematics-- He works very well.

But I am not always able to read his work.

He must learn that ink is for writing, not washing purposes.

Ms. Benson, my elderly French teacher,

somehow managed to omit the ink leitmotif.

But even her report had a sting in the tale.

French-- Plenty of ability, good pronunciation,

and a wonderful facility in escaping work.

I then went on to another school, a secondary school,

which was rather more spartan in some ways.

And I went through a religious phase, which I then

abandoned, and then became rather rebellious.

And with a couple of friends, we refused

to kneel down in chapel.

And so everybody else was kneeling down with bowed heads

and we were sitting upright, like islands of rebellion.

It being an Anglican school, they were very decent

and didn't take it out on us.

They didn't indoctrinate or punish us

in any way, which I think is a nice advertisement

for the Anglican church.

I hate to think what might have happened

if we'd been to a school run by a rival sect.

My housemaster, Mr. Ling, did make

sort of an effort to reform me.

I'm going to read a little bit here.

I've only recently learned that my housemaster, Peter Ling,

actually a nice man, if rather too conformist,

telephoned [? Johan ?] Thomas, my zoology master,

to voice his concern about me.

In a recent letter to me, Mr. Thomas

reported that he warned Mr. Ling that quote,

"requiring someone like you to attend chapel twice a day

on Sunday was doing you positive harm."

The phone went down without comment.

Mr. Ling also summoned my parents

for a heart-to-heart talk over tea--

that's the way we do things in England--

about my rebellious behavior in chapel.

I knew nothing of this at the time and my mother

has only just told me of the incident.

Mr. Ling asked my parents to try to persuade

me to change my ways.

My father said, approximately, by my mother's recollection,

it's not our business to control him in that sort of way.

That's kind of thing is your problem.

And I'm afraid I must decline your request.

My parents' attitude to the whole affair

with that it wasn't important.

Mr. Ling, as I said, was in his way a decent man.

A contemporary and friend of mine in the same house

recently told me the following nice story.

He was illicitly up in a dormitory during the day,

kissing one of the house maids.

The pair panicked when they had a heavy tread on the stairs.

And my friend hastily bundled the young woman up

onto a window sill and drew the curtains

to hide her standing form.

Mr. Ling came into the room and must

have noticed that only one of the three windows

had the curtains drawn.

Even worse, my friend noticed, to his horror,

that the girl's feet were clearly visible,

protruding under the curtain.

He firmly believed that Mr. Ling must

have realized what was going on, but pretended not to, perhaps

on boys will be boys grounds.

What are you doing up here in the dormitory at this hour?

Just came up to change my socks, sir.

Oh, well hurry on down.

Good call on Mr. Ling's part.

That boy went on to become probably

the most successful alumnus of his generation,

the mighty chief executive officer

of one of the largest international corporations

in the world and a generous benefactor of the school,

endowing, among other things, the Peter Ling Fellowship.

I don't mention the name in the book.

But I can divulge to you that that boy was Sir Howard

Stringer, who became the head of the Sony Corporation, the only

I then went on to Oxford, which was

I think the turning point in my life really.

It was wonderful to be educated to become a scholar

and to think, rather than educated

to learn about what was in textbooks.

And so I think a tremendous lot to the Oxford experience.

And in particular to various mentors at Oxford

and especially one, Michael Cullen,

who was the number two to Niko Tinbergen,

the great ethologist, animal behaviorist, who

later won the Nobel Prize.

Niko Tinbergen was my official research supervisor

as a graduate student, but Mike Cullen

was the one who really looked after me.

And I want to read to you-- I hope

I didn't break down when I do so.

I occasionally choke up a bit-- the eulogy

that I wrote for him his at his funeral,

in one of the Oxford college chapels.

He did not publish many papers himself.

Yet he worked prodigiously hard, both in teaching and research.

He was probably the most sought after tutor

in the entire zoology department.

The rest of his time-- he was always in a hurry

and worked a hugely long day-- was devoted to research,

but seldom his own research.

Everybody who knew him has the same story to tell.

All the obituaries told it in revealingly similar terms.

You would have a problem with your research.

You knew exactly where to go for help

and there he would be for you.

I see the scene as yesterday, the lunchtime conversation

in the kitchen, the wiry, boyish figure in the red sweater,

slightly hunched like a spring wound up,

with intense intellectual energy,

sometimes rocking back and forth with concentration.

The deeply intelligent eyes, understanding

what you meant even before the words came out.

The back of the envelope to aid explanation, the occasionally

skeptical, quizzical tilt to the eyebrows,

under the untidy hair.

Then he would have to rush off.

He always rushed everywhere and disappeared.

But next morning, the answer to your problem

would arrive, in Mike's small, distinctive handwriting,

two pages, often some algebra, diagrams,

a key reference to the literature,

sometimes an apt verse of his own composition,

a fragment of Latin or classical Greek, always encouragement.

We were grateful, but not grateful enough.

If we had thought about it, we would

have realized he must have been working

on that mathematical model of my research all evening.

And it isn't only for me for whom he does this,

everybody in the research group gets the same treatment,

and not just his own students.

I was officially Niko's student, not Mike's.

Mike took me on, without payment and

without official recognition when my research became

more mathematical than Niko could handle.

When the time came to me to write my thesis,

it was my Mike Cullen who read it, criticized it,

helped me polish every line.

And all this while he was doing the same thing

for his own, official students.

When, we all should have wondered,

does he get time for ordinary family life?

When does he get time for his own research?

No wonder he so seldom published anything.

No wonder he never wrote his long awaited book

on animal communication.

In truth, he should have been joint author

of just about every one of the hundreds of papers that

came out of that research group during that golden period.

In fact, his name appears on virtually none of them,

except in the acknowledgement section.

The worldly success of scientists

is charged for promotion or honors

by their published papers.

Mike did not rate highly on this index.

But if he had consented to add his name to his students'

publications as readily as modern supervisors insist

on putting their names on papers to which they contribute much

less, Mike would have been a conventionally successful

scientist, lauded with conventional honors.

As it is, he was a brilliantly successful scientist,

in a far deeper and truer sense.

And I think we know which kind of scientist we really admire.

Oxford sadly lost him to Australia.

Years later in Melbourne, at a party for me

as visiting lecturer, I was standing, probably rather

stiffly, with a drink in my hand.

Suddenly, a familiar figure shot into the room,

in a hurry as ever.

The rest of us were in suits, but not this familiar figure.

The years vanished away.

Everything was the same.

Though he must been well into his 60s by then,

he seemed still to be in his 30s,

the glow of boyish enthusiasm, even the red sweater.

Next day, he drove me to the coast

to see his beloved penguins, stopping on the way

to look at giant Australian earthworms, many feet long.

We tired the Sun with talking.

Not, I think, about old times and old friends,

and certainly not about ambition,

grant getting, and papers in "Nature."

But about new science and new ideas.

It was a perfect day, the last day I saw him.

We may know other scientists as intelligent as Mike Cullen,

though not many.

We may know other scientists who were as generous in support,

though vanishing few.

But I declare that we have no nobody who had so much to give,

combined with so much generosity in giving it.

From Oxford, I moved on to Berkeley,

where I spent two years as a very

junior assistant professor, who loved it.

But was then lured back to Oxford,

where I became a university lecturer

and eventually wrote "The Selfish Gene,"

after quite a while there at Oxford.

Throughout the book, I tried to put, in addition

to just stories about my life and the people I knew,

I tried to put little asides, perhaps little

scientific thoughts.

And I want now to read a couple of them.

They really are asides.

They could have come anywhere, almost.

The first is about-- actually the first two--

are about the luck that we all have in being here at all.

And I introduce it in the very first part

of the book, where I'm talking about my ancestors,

including one Clinton George Augustus Dawkins, 1808 to '71.

He was the British consul in Venice

and he was there during the war against Austria.

I have a cannonball in my possession,

sitting on a plinth, bearing an inscription on a brass plate.

I don't know who's is the authorial voice

and I don't know how reliable it is.

But for what it is worth, here is my translation

from French, then the language of diplomacy.

One night, when he was in bed, a cannonball

penetrated the bed covers and passed between his legs,

but happily did him no more than superficial damage.

This narrow escape of my ancestor's vital parts

took place before he was to put them to use.

And it is tempting to attribute my own existence

to a stroke of ballistic luck.

A few inches closer to the fork of Shakespeare's radish and--

But actually, my existence, and yours,

and the postman's, hangs from a far narrower thread of luck

than that.

We owe it to the precise timing and placing of everything

that ever happened since the universe began.

The incident of a cannonball is only a dramatic example

of a much more general phenomenon.

As I put it before, if the second dinosaur

to the left of the tall Cycad tree had not happened to sneeze

and thereby failed to catch the tiny shrew-like ancestor of all

the mammals, we would none of us be here.

We all can regard ourselves as exquisitely improbable.

But here, in a triumph of hindsight, we are.

And that theme of being lucky to be here I come back to

in the very last chapter, which is called "Looking Back Along

the Path," in which I tried to talk about all

the different things I described in my life

and say what would have happened if they

had been a bit different, if things

What if Alois Schicklgruber had happened

to sneeze at a particular moment, rather

than some other particular moment

during any year before mid-1888, when his son, Adolf Hitler,

was conceived?

You may know that Hitler's real surname was Schicklgruber.

Heil Schicklgruber doesn't have the same ring, does it?

Obviously, I have not the faintest idea

of the exact sequence of events involved.

And there are surely no historical records

of Herr Schicklgruber's sternutations,

but I'm confident that a change as trivial as a sneeze,

in say 1858, would have been more than enough to alter

the course of history.

The evil omen sperm that engendered

Adolf Hitler was one of countless billions

produced during his father's life.

And the same goes for his two grandfathers, four

great grandfathers, and so on back.

It is not only plausible, but I think certain,

that a sneeze many years before Hitler's conception

would have had knock-on effects sufficient to derail

the trivial circumstance that one particular sperm, that one

particular egg, thereby changing the entire course

of the 20th century, including my existence.

Of course, I'm not denying that something like the Second World

War might well have happened even without Hitler.

Nor am I saying that Hitler's evil madness was inevitably

ordained by his genes.

With a different upbringing, Hitler

might have turned out good, or at least uninfluential.

But certainly, his very existence,

and the war as it turned out, depended

upon the fortunate-- well, unfortunate-- happenstance

And I end that with a poem from Aldous Huxley.

A million million spermatozoa All of them alive;

Out of their cataclysm but one poor Noah Dare hope to survive.

And of that billion minus one Might have been Shakespeare,

another Newton, a new Donne-- But the One was Me.

Shame to have ousted your betters thus,

Taking ark while the others remained outside!

Better for all of us, froward Homunculus,

Well, I was told to stop at 1:30.

So I think maybe I'll stop and take questions at that point.

Would that be a good idea?

RAY KURTZWEIL: So that's a very interesting thought.

I've had that thought of the incredible improbability

of my own existence.

So I wonder what you thought is on the incredible improbability

of our universe having a standard model with these 15

or so constants, which is so precisely what they need

to be to allow for a universe that encodes information, which

is the enabling property for evolution

to be at all possible?

RICHARD DAWKINS: Yes.

It's a very interesting point.

Not all physicists accept that argument.

Victor Stenger, for example, says

that actually the alleged improbability of the universe

is less than many people think.

But assuming that it's right and that we have these 15 knobs,

that each one represents a fundamental constant

and if any one of those knobs had been tuned ever so slightly

different, the universe as we know

it would not have been possible.

Galaxies would not have formed.

Perhaps, stars would not have formed.

Therefore, the elements would not have formed.

Therefore, chemistry wasn't impossible.

Therefore, life wouldn't have been possible, and so on.

So there's a temptation to see the universe as a put-up job

and to see a divine creator as a divine knob twiddler, who

twiddled these knobs to exactly the right value in order

to foreshadow, foreordain, life, perhaps even human life.

I find that a deeply unsatisfying idea because

of course it leaves totally unexplained the divine knob

twiddler himself.

You need exactly the same problem.

If you can magic him into existence,

you might as well just magically the fine-tuning into existence.

Other physicists have resorted to a multiverse theory, where

they propose that this universe, our visible universe,

is only one of a bubbling foam of universes.

We are in one bubble.

And the other bubbles in the foam

have different physical constants.

So there are billions of universes in the multiverse,

all with different values of the physical constants, all

with different settings of the knobs.

And with hindsight, since we're here,

we obviously had to be in one of the bubbles, however

small a minority, which had the right physical constants

to give rise to galaxies, and stars, and chemistry, and life.

That's the anthropic principle.

It's obviously a lot more satisfying

than the divine knob twiddler idea.

Other physicists say that the 15 knobs,

or how many ever there are, are not free to vary anyway.

There's only one way for them to be.

But the standard model of physics

doesn't yet tell us what that way is.

And we need a better physics, which will one day tell us

that the values of the fundamental constants

could only be that way.

As Einstein put it, rather unfortunately,

in unfortunate language, Einstein

said what really interests me is whether God

had any choice in setting up the universe?

What he meant, of course, was is there only one kind of universe

that is possible to have or are there

lots of alternative ways in which a universe might exist,

in which case the multiverse theory works?

OK.

I probably said enough about that.

The next question?

AUDIENCE: OK.

Something very interesting I've noticed,

I mean this is about belief in a deity.

What I've usually seen is that some of the people

who are exposed to natural sciences,

especially through high school and college,

they kind of start to understand that-- I mean at least go away

from faith in a deity.

Interestingly, I've seen several scientists,

usually in abstract mathematics and sometimes computer science,

who actually, as the kind of grew up,

they start believing in maybe the abstract idea that

is kind of similar to what they've been experiencing.

I was wondering what's your thoughts on that

and what do you have to say to those people?

RICHARD DAWKINS: Yes.

Some research has been done on fellows of the National

Academy of Sciences in the United States,

the elite scientists of the United States

and the equivalent elite scientists

of the British Commonwealth, the Royal Society.

And these two independent studies

have both come up with the same result.

That about 90% of these elite scientists are nonbelievers.

About 10% have some kind of religious belief.

And within that 10%, there is a slightly greater tendency

for physical scientists and mathematical scientists

to be believers than for biological scientists,

which agrees with the observation

Quite often when you meet a religious scientist,

it's worth asking what he really does believe.

It often turns out to be a kind of Einsteinian religion.

I mean Einstein did not believe in a personal god.

Einstein used the language of religion,

used the language of God, to refer

to that which we don't yet understand.

And he had a deep and fitting reverence

for that which we don't understand.

And I think many of us would agree

that we feel-- some might call it spiritual

when we think about the enormous amount that we don't yet know,

the deep mysteries of existence, the deep mysteries

of the universe.

But that's hugely different from believing

in a personal god, the god of Abraham, the god of Moses,

the god of Jesus, the god of Muhammad.

And I think it does a disservice to use

the same language for those two things.

As to why biologists should be slightly more

likely to be nonreligious than physicists,

I think that might come from the fact

that Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection

is deeply anti-design in the sense of deliberate design

by a creative intelligence.

If you think about it, the great achievement of Darwin

was to show that we don't need a creative intelligence.

What Darwin showed is that entities complicated

enough to be creative designers, things like a human brain--

the human brain is perhaps the only one

we know-- entities complex enough

to do that don't suddenly get magicked into existence.

They come about through a very slow, gradual process,

exactly like the carving out of the Grand Canyon,

as Ray Kurtzweil said.

So biologists are predisposed to be hostile to any attempt

to smuggle in an intelligence by magic

because we know how intelligence comes about.

We know how it comes about that brains

exist which are capable of designing

planes, and cameras, and computers.

So that may be why there's a slightly greater bias.

But all scientists of these two elite groups, the Royal Society

and the National Academy, only about 10% are religious.

And even they, one wonders whether they're

religious in the Einsteinian sense, rather

than the personal god sense.

AUDIENCE: Thank you.

AUDIENCE: Hi.

You've done all kinds of great works.

I'm sorry to follow up a religion question

with another religion question, but--

RICHARD DAWKINS: They usually are, I have to say.

RAY KURTZWEIL: This might be a gross oversimplification

or perhaps even a misinterpretation of your work.

But something that struck me as one of the arguments

in "The God Delusion" is sort of we

can as biological entities, conscious ones,

realize maybe the pull towards religion

and how that affects us and choose to not follow that.

And I'm wondering how you would compare that

with other things that might be a part of our nature,

sort of chemically and physically as

biological beings, what that means to how we react

to other things, in addition to religion,

such as sexual desire, or love, and other aspects that

might be considered "better?"

RICHARD DAWKINS: Right.

So I think I may have got the question.

Things like sexual desire are built into us

by natural selection for reasons we can clearly understand.

I mean obviously natural selection

is all about the surviving of genes and genes

get passed on by reproduction.

And we need sex for reproduction.

And so we have rules of thumb in our brain

which make us lust after the opposite sex.

Other things, like religion, might come from something

I mean I don't think religion has a direct genetic survival

value in the way that sexual lust does.

But perhaps another way to put it

would be that there are psychological predispositions

which under the right cultural circumstances

manifest themselves as religion.

And I suppose you could say in a way

that sexual lust, under the right cultural conditions,

manifests itself as great poetry like "Romeo and Juliet."

So it's not all that different.

The kind of psychological predisposition I'm thinking of

is well, because we're very social animals,

we have a natural tendency to calculate debts

to others, things that we owe to others because reciprocation

is so important for good Darwinian reasons.

And so we are aware of who owes us what.

We are aware of whom we owe things to.

And when something really good happens,

we swim so much in a sea of other people

that we naturally think we need to thank somebody

because so much of what happens to us

is because of social interactions.

And so we feel a need to thank.

And often there really is somebody to thank.

Often, it really is another person

who is responsible for the good thing that's happened to us

and so we thank them.

But when there's no other person to be responsible

for-- to be grateful to, if say the weather turns out

nice for our barbecue- take a trivial example--

we still feel the impulse to thank.

But there's nobody to thank.

I mean nobody actually called the weather to be nice.

So you thank God.

So maybe that's a small component

of the psychological predisposition

that led to religion.

Another one might be the tendency

for children to obey and believe their parents.

In the wild state, a child is extremely

vulnerable to being killed by accident and by foolishness.

So a child brain might be naturally selected,

comes into the world preprogrammed

with the rule, whatever else you do,

believe what your parents tell you.

If they tell you not to go too close to the cliff,

don't ask questions, just obey.

If they tell you not to pick up a snake, don't ask questions.

Don't obey the sort of scientific curiosity impulse.

Just obey your parents.

Don't touch that snake.

Well, if the child brain is preprogrammed

with that rule of thumb, obey and believe your parents,

it has no means of distinguishing

between good advice like "don't touch the snake"

and bad or at least time-wasting advice like

"perform a sacrifice at the time of the full moon"

or "pray five times a day, facing the East."

How could the child know which is good advice

and which is bad?

If it knew, it wouldn't need the advice.

It would just know.

So the child brain is preprogrammed,

just as a computer is built, to obey whatever instructions it's

given, in its own machine language.

And that's why computers are vulnerable to computer viruses.

A computer doesn't have any filter

that says the instructions I'm now being given

are evil instructions, designed to wipe somebody's hard disk

and destroy their doctoral thesis.

Why do people do that, by the way?

Can you imagine?

The computer is simply built to obey whatever instructions it's

given in the appropriate machine language.

And that's why it's vulnerable to computer viruses.

And so another way to put what I've just suggested

is that religions are computer viruses, the mind viruses.

AUDIENCE: I guess just to be blunt about it, to go forward,

to follow that analogy sort of, why

is following those predispositions

towards religion sort of bad?

I get that impression from-- as opposed to following

say love, which might be another biological process that we

follow [INAUDIBLE].

RICHARD DAWKINS: Yes.

No, I didn't mean to say it's bad.

It could be good.

And I mean I'm not sure how widely it's done,

but it has been suggested that computer viruses too

could be good.

That you could-- if it comes from anywhere,

it probably come from Google actually-- the idea

that you could use the principle of a program that

spreads itself, because it spreads, because it spreads,

because it spreads, because it contains

the instruction, spread me around the internet.

It could be benign.

I mean you could spread a good mind virus, a good computer

virus.

So there's nothing that says that the analogy to computer

viruses has to have to be bad.

But it could be.

And in some cases, I think it probably is.

At best, some of them might be time wasting.

I mean it is an awful waste of time spending

hours on your knees praying to some nonexistent spook.

AUDIENCE: I, of course, have another question

on atheism and religion.

[LAUGHTER] So my question, organized religion of course

has a long history of sexism.

And you might expect atheism to do better in this regard.

And I think it's true that it does.

But organized atheism also had several incidents

with male-dominated events, both in terms of audience

and in terms of people speaking, and also major incidents,

both at conferences and in online discussions.

And you yourself have been criticized in this regard.

And I'm wondering is there some reason that atheism

falls victim to the same traps as--

RICHARD DAWKINS: Well, I think it's a very unfortunate thing

that many institutions fall victim to.

And it would be quite surprising if atheist conferences

and atheist organizations were completely immune to it.

AUDIENCE: Is there some way we could better?

RICHARD DAWKINS: Sorry?

AUDIENCE: Is there some way we could do better?

Something that [INAUDIBLE]?

RICHARD DAWKINS: Yes.

I mean I think we all need to do better.

I think it's pretty clear that there's nothing particularly

bad about this in the atheist world.

But there is a need to do better certainly.

Yes, I agree.

AUDIENCE: Is there some way we could do better?

Like something we could do differently maybe?

RICHARD DAWKINS: Well, I mean treat all human beings as

of equal worth and don't looked down upon 50% of the population

because they happen to have different genitals.

[APPLAUSE]

AUDIENCE: So I don't have a question about religion.

[APPLAUSE] In your book, you were

reflecting on a bunch of different memories, one

of them of somebody who has passed.

I was wondering if you'd be willing to share

a memory about somebody else who has passed,

Christopher Hitchens?

Is there any favorite memory that you

might find useful to share with us?

RICHARD DAWKINS: I think he was--

I mean I was a friend of his, but only in his later life.

I wasn't one of the early coterie of friends like Martin

Amis, and Salman Rushdie, and Ian McEwan.

So I only met him I think after 2006, when we both published

books at around the same time, on a similar theme.

He was, I think, the most spellbinding orator

I ever heard.

He was a magnificent speaker, a beautiful, resonant voice,

superbly resourceful, with what must have been something

close to a photographic memory, able to pull out examples

with great speed and to best anybody in debate.

I once wrote a puff for him which

said something like if you are a religious apologist invited

to have a debate with Christopher Hitchens, decline.

He was a warm, friendly man.

He didn't suffer fools gladly, but he was patient as well.

I had enormous admiration for him.

I disagreed with him on certain things.

I disagreed with him over the Iraq War, for example.

He was impossible to typecast on sort

of standard left, right continuum.

He was his own man in that, as in so much else.

His approach to atheism came from a slightly different

direction than mine.

Mine is more scientific.

So for me, what really matters is

the truth about the universe.

And the god hypothesis, it seems to me

to be an alternative hypothesis about the nature

of the universe and its origins, which is I think clearly false.

And so for me, it's a scientific battle.

For Christopher, I think it was more a political one.

I think he saw religions as political organizations.

And he saw God as a sort of divine dictator.

And he saw the kingdom of God as a kind of divine North Korea.

Perhaps, enough of that.

AUDIENCE: I was looking at some of your personal details

earlier.

And was surprised to see that you're married to the best

"Doctor Who" companion ever.

RICHARD DAWKINS: Here, here.

AUDIENCE: And I'd like to know are you

a big fan of "Doctor Who?"

RICHARD DAWKINS: Well, I became a big fan of "Doctor Who"

only after I met her actually, I'm ashamed to admit.

I'd heard of "Doctor Who."

But I'd never actually watched any of the episodes.

And then after we married, I did watch, not DVDs,

it was-- what do you call them?

Tapes, yeah.

[LAUGHTER]

And I did become a fan of those tapes.

I loved them.

Not least actually, because in her time,

which was the Tom Baker era, who many people regard

as the definitive Doctor as well,

the script was written by Douglas Adams.

And was consequently witty, satirical, and appreciated

on different-- I mean it was a children's program.

And it's appreciated much by children.

But also, there was a witty irony,

which was appreciated by adults as well.

And that's got Douglas Adams written all over it.

And you can appreciate Douglas's episodes of "Doctor Who,"

which included the Tom Baker and Lalla Ward

times as beautiful satire, of the same kind of satire

as he was to use also in the "Hitchhiker's Guide"

and in his Dirk Gently series.

So making science into comedy-- laughing

at, in a sort of genial, benevolent, satirical way,

scientific ideas-- and satirizing contemporary life

was something that he did supremely well.

And that got into "Doctor Who" at that time.

AUDIENCE: Hi.

I personally believe that we live

in a universe which is governed by physical laws.

That's it's not necessary to have

spirits or anything like that.

I understand that other people, their behavior

may be explainable using physical processes

and that I should apply that to myself also.

But I'm struggling at the moment with where

does this kind of sensation come from,

my consciousness, my awareness of myself?

And I don't really have an answer for that at the moment.

So I wonder if you could help?

[LAUGHTER]

RICHARD DAWKINS: I mean ditto, ditto, ditto.

I am as mystified as you.

I feel exactly the same way.

I am aware that my brain is the product of natural selection,

evolution by natural selection.

And it is a machine.

It's an on-board computer.

It's helped my ancestors to survive

on the African plains, in the Pleistocene and before.

And somehow an emergent property of that large brain

is the feeling of subjective consciousness, which

makes me know that I'm me and not you.

Makes me believe that you have a personality

and you have a consciousness, which is similar to mine,

that I can never actually get inside your mind,

That doesn't make you a solipsist.

It's the exact opposite, of course.

A solipsist is someone who thinks

that he's the only person that there is

and everybody else is, as it were, part of his dream.

There was a nice story by Bertrand Russell.

That he had a letter from a lady who said, Dear Lord Russell,

I'm delighted to hear that you are a solipsist.

There are so few of us around these days.

I suppose that people like you and me

have to think that something about making a brain which

is good at navigating through the world in a versatile way,

coping with all sorts of different things that happen,

not moving through a stereotype world

like some computer programs, which can only navigate

through a world of colored bricks or a table

or something of that sort.

We have to navigate through a very versatile world.

Above all, we have to navigate through a world in which

the dominant things that we see, we encounter are other people.

Like ourselves.

We have to interact with sexual partners, with business rivals,

with business companions, with co-workers,

with possible enemies, with children.

All the time, we're surrounded by people

and we have to interact with them.

I suppose you could say that something

about needing to interact with other people

might facilitate the setting up of a model in the head.

We all have models in the head of the world in which we move.

I mean when we see something, what we're doing

is constructing a model in the head of that something.

And you can show this with visual illusions.

When you construct a similar model of the other people

you're having to deal with and you have to put yourself

in their place, maybe something about the model of other people

that you have to make necessitates the generation

of subjective consciousness.

But that doesn't really do it, does it?

That's sort of based on an idea of Nicholas Humphrey.

Daniel Dennett has more advanced ideas

in his book, "Consciousness Explained."

And I think I better not go on too much with that.

But you could look at "Consciousness Explained"

and see if that does it for you.

There's other people who are attempting to do it.

I sort of feel it's one of those things

that maybe one day it'll seem awfully obvious

and how could we be so stupid as not to realize it.

But at present, it does seem to be a deep mystery.

Sorry about that.

AUDIENCE: So I read the big footnotes

to "The Selfish Gene."

And one of my takeaways from it is

that it's really not about being selfish.

I was absolutely uplifted by how much cooperation helps people.

And somehow like the reasoning in this book kind of

flipped me over.

So my plea would be, could you write more articles

with maybe better, catchier titles?

And my suggestion would be-- I don't know who to attribute it,

but I love this one, Snuggle for Survival.

RICHARD DAWKINS: OK.

Thank you.

Yes.

I mean you're absolutely right.

That the central message of "The Selfish Gene"

is not that we are selfish.

Still less is it that we should be selfish.

It's actually mostly a book about altruism,

snuggling if you wish to put it that way.

And it is true that title-- I think most of my other titles

have been OK, actually, "The Blind Watchmaker,"

"Unweaving the Rainbow," "Climbing Mount Improbable,"

I did show an early pair of chapters

to a well-known London publisher before I gave it

the title, "The Selfish Gene."

He said you can't call it "The Selfish Gene."

It's a down word. "Selfish" is a down word.

Call it The Immortal Gene.

And that would have been good, I think,

because it does also convey another aspect of it.

The reason why natural selection can

be said to work at the level of the gene

is that genes are immortal, or potentially immortal.

And therefore, in the long-term, survival of genes

is what really matters.

And if they were not potentially immortal,

it wouldn't matter which one survived and which ones didn't.

So "the immortal gene," it's a phrase I use in the book.

And that possibly would have been better.

I also suggested in the book that it

could have been called The Slightly Selfish Big

Bit of Chromosome, With the Even More Selfish Little

RAY KURTZWEIL: Let me ask you to actually follow up

on this last question.

You described religion as a set of mind viruses.

Another word for mind virus is meme,

which is your I think very apt word.

And some of those memes could be bad or good.

And I think one of the good memes from religion

is the golden rule, which is a synonym for altruism,

which you just alluded to.

And you had a very interesting thesis in "The Selfish Gene"

about how altruism originates or evolves in nature.

So maybe you could sum up by sharing

your view of how altruism evolves?

RICHARD DAWKINS: Yes.

The golden rule, of course, is terribly important.

I think it would be unfair to attribute it to religion.

It's true that many of the great religions have adopted it.

But I think it actually does have older roots than that.

And that's really what you're asking about,

which is the evolutionary roots of the golden rule.

Do as you would be done by, so unto others as you

Altruism has two main evolutionary roots.

One is that.

One is reciprocation.

One is the survival value of doing good turns because others

may do good turns to you.

And the mathematical theory of that, the best way

to approach it, is the mathematical theory of games.

And the theory has been well worked out.

And it does indeed work in an evolutionary context.

And a lot of "The Selfish Gene" is actually

about the game theory of-- well, game theory generally,

including aggression and reciprocation.

The other main source of altruism is kinship.

It's easy to see nowadays-- it wasn't originally--

but nowadays, we can see that any gene that

makes an individual animal behave altruistically

towards genetic relatives has, other things being equal,

a good chance of propagating itself

because those genetic relatives statistically

are likely to contain copies of the same gene.

And so anyone can see that that's true for offspring.

What W.D. Hamilton showed is that it's also

true of collateral kin, like nephews

and nieces, and cousins, and siblings.

Well, humans probably spent a large part

of their ancestral life in small bands,

perhaps rather like baboons, in which they were surrounded

by a group, a clan, who would have been

mostly cousins, mostly relatives.

And therefore, there would have been a genetic kinship pressure

to be altruistic towards everybody in your band, which

pretty much meant everybody you ever meet.

And at the same time, since you meet the same people

over and over again in your band,

you're going to meet them again and again throughout your life,

that is perfect raw material for reciprocation.

It's perfect conditions for the evolution

of reciprocation, reciprocal altruism, the golden rule

in one way, putting it.

So the fact that humans went around in limited bands,

clans, fostered altruism in these two different ways

and provided what could be called a lust

to be nice, which was analogous to the lust for sex.

The lust for sex worked because before the days

of contraception, sex tended to be followed by babies.

Nowadays, sex very often is not followed by babies

because we're all wise to contraception.

And so we still enjoy sex, even though we know perfectly well

cognitively that we've separated it,

we've dissociated it from its Darwinian function.

But we still have the lust.

And why on earth, shouldn't we?

Because the lust was built into our brains

at a time when contraception had not been invented.

Natural selection doesn't have cognitive wisdom.

Natural selection simply builds in clockwork rules of thumb.

The lust for sex is just such a clockwork rule.

And the lust to be nice is also.

Because it evolved at a time when we did

live in small groups.

Nowadays, we don't live in small groups.

We live in large cities, where we are not

surrounded by cousins.

And we're not surrounded by people

we're going to meet again and again in our lives.

We're surrounded by perfect strangers.

But the lust to be nice is still there, just as the lust for sex

is still there.

The lust to be nice still works.

We still feel empathy towards somebody in distress.

We still feel we want to do a good turn to people

who is neither related to us, nor in a position

to give the good turn back.

But it's there.

And we feel it.

It's an extremely powerful emotion.

There are a few people, and we call

them psychopaths, who don't have it.

But most of us do have it.

Most of us do have empathy.

Most of us do have pity for people in misfortune.

Most of us give to charity and so on.

So I think that would be my attempt

at a Darwinian explanation for the origin of altruism.

And it becomes, of course, much more sophisticated

due to cultural evolution, which you can if you wish,

interpret in terms of memes, not in what it does.